A secure method for steganography is proposed. Pixelvalue differencing (PVD) steganography and bit-plane complexity segmentation (BPCS) steganography have the weakness of generating blocky effects and noise in smooth areas and being detectable with steganalysis. To overcome these weaknesses, a secure bit-plane based steganography method on the spatial domain is presented, which uses a robust measure to select noisy blocks for embedding messages. A matrix embedding technique is also applied to reduce the change of cover images. Given that the statistical property of cover images is well preserved in stego-images, the proposed method is undetectable by steganalysis that uses RS analysis or histogram-based analysis. The proposed method is compared with the PVD and BPCS steganography methods. Experimental results confirm that the proposed method is secure against potential attacks.
method is presented that avoids the weaknesses of the BPCS and PVD methods, i.e., blocky effects and noise in smooth areas. A robust measure to select noisy blocks for message embedding is designed and a matrix embedding technique is applied to reduce the changes that are made to the cover images. The proposed method is compared with the BPCS and PVD steganography methods. Since the statistical property of cover images is well preserved, the proposed method achieves the security against steganalysis using RS analysis or histogram-based analysis including potential attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the use of steganography in the spatial domain and the means by which steganalysis might defeat it are explained. In Sect. 3, a secure steganography method is described. In Sect. 4 , experimental results are presented. Section 5 concludes.
Steganography and Steganalysis
Whenever a steganography algorithm appears, steganalysts try to identify its weaknesses and defeat it. This section reviews two recent steganography methods, PVD and BPCS steganography, and their weakness against steganalysis.
PVD Steganography and Its Weakness
PVD steganography embeds message bits by changing the difference between the values of two pixels. The basic process is as follows [4] . The cover image is divided into nonoverlapping blocks of two consecutive pixels, which is performed through all rows in a zigzag manner. The difference between the values, p i and p i+1 , of the two pixels in the block is calculated as follows: d = p i+1 − p i , whose range is [−255, 255] . |d| is classified into K contiguous ranges R k where k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 and the width R k is a power of 2. The practical set of R k is [0 7], [8 15 [128 255 ] with lower bound l k , upper bound u k , and width w k . Finally, if |d| is in R k , a message word with log 2 (w k ) bits is embedded into the corresponding two-pixel block.
A log 2 (w k )-bit message word has a decimal value b. The new difference d , which has the same range R k with |d|, is calculated as follows: 
where
When it is possible that a block will cause an overflow due to message embedding, i.e., if the result of embedding will be that the value of p i or p i+1 lies outside the range [0 255], that block is labeled as unusable and excluded. Obviously, if the portion of unusable blocks is large, the embedding capacity is decreased significantly.
Weakness: PVD steganography method avoids randomly changing pixel values; hence, RS steganalysis fails to defeat it. However, PVD histogram-based steganalysis can detect it [6] . Although enhanced PVD steganography methods are robust against PVD histogram-based steganalysis, the fact that the difference of pixel values is used and the property of neighboring pixels in smooth areas is erased by making noise in all bit planes can be used by steganalysis researchers to defeat it. In addition, using small block sizes e.g. 2 × 1 to find embeddable blocks for message embedding cannot be adaptive with image property.
BPCS Steganography and Its Weakness
BPCS steganography embeds message bits by replacing the bit planes of noisy binary blocks with message bits. To select the noisy binary blocks, the complexity α of the m × m size block is measured as follows [5] :
where k is the total number of the change between 0 and 1 along all rows and columns. When the complexity α exceeds α T , the block is regarded as a noisy binary block, where α T is a noise threshold (α T = 0.3 or α T = 0.5).
The basic embedding process is as follows [5] . The cover image is converted into canonical gray code. After the image is decomposed into N bit planes, each bit plane is divided into non-overlapping blocks of size m × m. In addition, the message bits are split into a series of blocks of size m×m. If a message block is not noisy, its conjugation is generated to make a noisy binary block. Finally, the bit planes of noisy binary blocks in the cover image are replaced by the series of message blocks.
Weakness: Differently from PVD steganography, BPCS steganography does not make non-noisy blocks in bit planes into noisy blocks. However, BPCS steganography methods use large block sizes (4 × 4 or 8 × 8 pixels) as a unit to determine whether a block is noisy or not. As a result, blocky effects occur in bit planes during the replacing of the blocks of the cover image by message blocks. In addition, using a checkerboard pattern to convert message blocks into cover blocks is not always successful [12] . Steganalysis methods [7] , [8] are able to exploit the blocky effects to defeat BPCS steganography. Although using small block sizes can avoid blocky effects, BPCS steganography requires more header information to keep the conjugation map.
Proposed Steganography Method
Several factors need to be considered if a secure steganography method is to be designed: avoiding non-noisy blocks to embed message bits (thereby avoiding the weakness of PVD steganography), measuring the complexity based on a small block size (thereby avoiding the weakness of BPCS and PVD steganography), measuring the complexity using high bit planes of pixels, and embedding into multiple bit planes of pixels simultaneously (thereby avoiding the weakness of BPCS steganography).
Taking these factors into account, we design a measure to calculate the complexity using a small block size and high bit planes of pixels. In addition, the matrix embedding technique to scatter message bits is adapted, such that noisier blocks are embedded before less noisy blocks. These techniques for message embedding and extraction are explained below.
Selecting Embeddable Blocks
Each pixel of an image I is composed of N + 1 bits (gray: N = 7, RGB: N = 7 for each channel). A binary sequence b 0 ..b N x,y represents a pixel value p x,y at position (x, y), where b N is the least significant bit. The set of binary numbers b i of all pixels in one block represents the bit plane B i of that block.
Given that the proposed method embeds message bits into noisy blocks and avoids embedding them into nonnoisy blocks of bit planes, a rule is formulated to identify the noisy blocks of bit plane i. We define a block whose size is 2 × 2 pixels: p x,y , p x+1,y ; p x,y+1 , p x+1,y+1 . The block is i-bit-plane smooth when the following four conditions are satisfied at the same time:
where the threshold t is set at 1 throughout the experiment. For example, when a 2 × 2 block has the pixel values 191, 168, 190, 155 (10111111, 10101000 ,10111110, 10011011 in binary), the four conditions above are satisfied when i = 3 and hence this block is 3-bit-plane smooth. All pixels of the cover image are defined as a set R. All overlapping blocks that are i-bit-plane smooth are defined as a set RS i . Then, the set of all i-bit-plane noisy blocks is
The i-bit-plane noisy blocks RN i are embeddable blocks, where message bits are embedded into low bit planes from B i to B 7 . The i-bit-plane noisy blocks will be sharp edge areas if i is small. In our experiment, we set at i S = 2. Problems of overlapping will occur during the embedding of message bits into low bit planes of a block that is i-bit-plane smooth and j-bit-plane smooth, where j < i. To avoid the overlapping problem, we determine, for each i, the set of embeddable blocks such that message bits are embedded only into these blocks. The set of the embeddable blocks corresponding to the set of i-bit-plane noisy blocks will include the set of all i-bit-plane noisy blocks and exclude the set of j-bit-plane noisy blocks with j < i, as follows:
where i S ≤ i ≤ 7. For each i, message bits are embedded into bit-plane by bit-plane from B i to B N of RE i .
Scattering Message Bits
i-bit-plane noisy blocks with small i values are noisy parts, such as edge areas. i-bit-plane noisy blocks with high i values include flat areas. Therefore, when i has high values, the embedding priority of that block should be low. To determine the embedding priority, we apply a matrix embedding technique called matrix encoding [9] - [11] . Assume that we have an n-bit codeword a for embedding a k-bit message x. A hash function f extracts k bits from a modified codeword a . The matrix embedding technique finds a suitable modified codeword a for every a and x with x = f (a ), such that the Hamming distance [9] ). We define (d max , n, k) as the matrix embedding parameter, where a codeword with n places will be changed in not more than d max places to embed a k-bit message. For (1, n, k), the codeword length is n = 2 k − 1. The hash function f (a) is defined as follows:
where ⊕ is a bitwise XOR operation that yields 1 as result if and only if an odd number of the variables are 1. The bit position that should be changed in the codeword a is selected by calculating s = x ⊕ f (a). The changed codeword results in
For example, a message x that has k = 3 bits: x = 001 2 is embedded into a codeword a that has n = 7 bits: a = 1011111 2 . Then, the matrix embedding technique is applied with parameters (d max , n, k) = (1, 7, 3) . So, we modify one bit in the codeword a to embed three bits of the message x as follows. First, we calculate a hash value f (a).
Then, we find the bit position s to change: s = x ⊕ f (a) = 001 2 ⊕ 010 2 = 011 2 = 3 10 . As a result, the modified codeword will be a = 1001111 2 . To extract x from a , we have
The proposed method modifies fewer bits in the noisy blocks of lower bit planes (RN i having high i values) . With high k values, the length of codeword a is long with n = 2 k − 1 bits and only one bit is modified in 2 k − 1 bits. Therefore, k is set to increase as i increases. In our experiment, we embedded message bits into i-bit-plane noisy blocks with i S = 2 ≤ i ≤ 7 and k = i − 1.
In addition, a pseudo-random sequence is used to scatter message bits more widely. This sequence indexes the embeddable bits in bit-planes. Hence, a sender and a receiver who have the same steganography key can generate the same pseudo-random sequence. In our experiment, an ISAAC (Indirection, Shift, Accumulate, Add, and Count) pseudo-random generator [13] is adapted to generate a random sequence.
Embedding Process
The secret message is compressed and encrypted with a cryptography scheme to increase the security. Then, it is embedded into the bit planes of cover images. The embedding process, which uses the complexity measure and matrix embedding technique, is depicted in Fig. 1 .
(E1) A cover image I is decomposed into (N + 1) bit planes B 0 , .., B N − 1, B N and i is set at i S = 2. (E2) A secret message M is compressed and encrypted with a cryptographic key K C to stream message bits M . (E3) The ISAAC pseudo-random generator is initiated with a steganographic key K S to generate a pseudo-random sequence that indexes the bits that can be embedded in bit planes. (E4) Message bits are embedded into bit planes by repeating i from i S to N = 7. (E4.1) After the set of i-bit-plane smooth blocks RS i has been selected by identifying those blocks that meet the four conditions for all overlapping 2 × 2 blocks in the image I, the set of embeddable i-bit-plane noisy blocks RE i is acquired. (E4. 2) The matrix embedding parameters k, n are calculated and the embedding loop index e is initiated as N. (E4.3) The message bits M are embedded into the bit plane B e of RE i . This embedding step is repeated with e = e − 1 until e = i or until the end of the message bit M . (E4.4) When the end of the message bits M is reached, i.e., once all of the message bits M have been embedded, the embedding process is complete and the stego-image I is returned. (E4.5) If e = i is not satisfied, the embedding process is performed on the bit plane B e of RE i . Remaining message bits are embedded continuously into the next bit plane B e−1 of RE i until e = i. When e = i, step E4.1 is performed with i = i + 1 until the condition i = N + 1 is satisfied. (E4.6) If i = N + 1 and message bits M remain, the proposed method is not able to embed all the message bits M into the image that was chosen for embedding.
Extracting Process
Due to the fact that the secret message was embedded into the bit planes from B i to B N of i-bit-plane noisy blocks, the noisy blocks should be identified using only stego-images. In other words, the proposed method does not use cover images during extraction. The extraction process is depicted in Fig. 2 .
(D1) A stego-image I is decomposed into (N + 1) bit planes B 0 , .., B N − 1, B N . (D2) The ISAAC pseudo-random generator is initiated with a steganographic key K S and generates a pseudo-random sequence, which is the same as that used during the embedding process. (D3) Embedded message bits are extracted from bit planes by repeating i from i S to N = 7. (D3.1) The set of i-bit-plane noisy blocks RE i are identified using a process similar to that which was used during the embedding process. (D3.2) Matrix embedding parameters k, n, are calculated and the loop index e is initiated 
Experimental Results
The proposed method was tested on a set of classical images and Kodak photographs (http://r0k.us/graphics/kodak) and the results compared with those yielded by the BPCS and PVD steganography methods. The images were num- Figure 3 depicts the maximum embedding capacity of the proposed method, which depends on the images that are chosen for embedding and has values of around 1.2% to 10.2%. For example, a 26 KB message was embedded into the 258 KB Baboon image (the embedding rate was 26/258 ≈ 10.2%). The maximum embedding capacity of the proposed method was lower than that of the BPCS and PVD steganography methods. However, the BPCS and PVD steganography methods reveal their weakness at high embedding rates, as is described in Sect. 4.1. The only way to increase the security of the BPCS and PVD steganography methods is by using low embedding rates.
In order to compare steganography methods under RS steganalysis and histogram based steganalysis (Sects. 4.2 and 4.3), the same low embedding rate was applied for each method. First, we applied the proposed steganography method with maximum embedding rates to obtain the embedded image and the embedded message bits for each image. Then, the same message bits were embedded using the BPCS and PVD steganography methods. Hence, the embedding rate is the same for each of the proposed, BPCS, and PVD steganography methods.
For each image, Fig. 4 depicts Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) values with the embedding rates stated in Fig. 3 under the three steganography methods. The PSNR values of the proposed method were lower than those of other steganography methods. However, at the low embedding rate, the PSNR is not a good measure of security because the PSNR values of stego-images are always high. When the PSNR values are high, the naked eye cannot discriminate between cover images and stego-images.
Analysis with Bit-plane View
Although a high rate of embedding can be achieved when using BPCS and PVD steganography, their weaknesses can be seen easily at high embedding rates. Figure 5 depicts the bit plane B 6 of a stego-image at an embedding rate 20%, using BPCS and PVD steganography. With BPCS steganography, bit plane B 6 has visible noise in cycle areas. As mentioned in Sect. 2, PVD steganography makes noise in flat areas of bit planes. Hence, with PVD steganography, bitplane B 6 did not have visible shapes like the bit plane B 6 of the cover image in any areas. Given that these artifacts are easily noticed with the naked eye, BPCS and PVD steganography can be defeated by visual analysis of the bit plane.
Analysis with RS Steganalysis
RS steganalysis was designed to defeat LSB steganography and is able to estimate the message length [3] . RS steganalysis begins by dividing a cover image into disjoint groups of n adjacent pixels G = (x 1 , .., x n ). In practice, n = 4, which represents consecutive pixels in a row. The discrimination function f measures the difference in value between n pixels in the group as follows:
The invertible function F on a pixel value x is defined by three cases. The first case is an identity permutation function After the function F is applied to a group G, three groups can be generated: regular group R, singular group S , and unusable group U.
The various kinds of flipping are applied to different pixels in the group G decided by a mask M, which is a n-tuple with values −1, 0 and 1 (in [3] , M = 0 1 1 0 ). Let the number of the regular R and singular S group for the mask M be R M and S M , respectively, and let the corresponding values for the negative mask −M be R −M and S −M , respectively (as percentages of all groups). In [3] , R M ≈ R −M and S M ≈ S −M are satisfied in typical images. When an image breaks these rules, it is concluded on the basis of the RS steganalysis that the image includes secret message bits.
In our experiment, we defined a RS difference rate RS di f as follows to check whether an image breaks the rules and thereby to detect the existence of the secret message:
If RS di f is high, RS steganalysis can detect a secret message. Figure 6 depicts the RS di f for test images. Although the BPCS steganography method was performed with low embedding rates, the LSB bit plane was modified; hence, RS steganalysis sensitive to LSB modification could defeat it. Table 1 summarizes the mean and standard derivation of the RS di f on 30 test images. The the presence of a message embedded using BPCS steganography could be detected because the statistical difference between stegoimages and cover images was large. However, the proposed and PVD steganography methods overcame RS steganalysis at the same embedding rate.
Analysis with PVD Histogram Steganalysis
The PVD histogram-based steganalysis method was applied to stego-images produced by the proposed, BPCS, and PVD steganography methods. In all images, the PVD histogram of the BPCS and PVD steganography methods was not well preserved. The PVD steganography method caused fluctuation and step effects in the histogram. In addition, the BPCS steganography method caused fluctuation and step effects, although these were less severe in this case than in the case of the PVD steganography method. Figure 7 depicts the PVD histogram from the three steganography methods at the same embedding rate in the Baboon image. The use of the BPCS and PVD steganography methods were detectable by PVD histogram-based steganalysis. However, the PVD histogram was almost unchanged when the proposed method was used. Therefore, the proposed method is robust against this steganalysis.
Conclusion
Recent BPCS and PVD steganography methods on the spatial domain have been studied to enhance their security against their steganalysis. However, they still have weaknesses that can be exploited, such as histogram fluctuation and blocky effects. In this paper, a secure steganography method based on embedding message bits into multi bit-planes of cover images was presented. We designed a complexity measure to locate the noisy blocks for message embedding and adopted the matrix embedding technique to reduce the change of cover images. The proposed method was tested against RS steganalysis and PVD histogram-based steganalysis and the results compared with the results of using BPCS and PVD steganography methods at the same embedding rates. The experiment results confirmed that the proposed method is more robust against steganalysis than other steganography methods, although the maximum embedding capacity was low. In future work, the proposed method will be applied to images on the wavelet domain. In addition, its robustness against various steganalysis methods will be analyzed.
